**06KATHMANDU3253**

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VZCZCXYZ0004 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHKT #3253/01 3540841 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 200841Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4240 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5157 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 5425 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0596 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 3424 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4788 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0705 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2256 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

 C O N F I D E N T I A L KATHMANDU 003253 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR PREF CASC UN BT NP SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER TAKES FIRM STAND ON ARMS MANAGEMENT, MAOIST PRESSURE REF: SECSTATE 179582 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas J. Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) Summary ------- [Â¶](http://www.bhutan-research.org/us-diplomatic-cables-on-bhutan/06kathmandu3253#par1) 1. (C) Prime Minister GP Koirala, who was recovering from a cold, stressed to the Ambassador December 20 that he would not permit the Maoists to enter the interim government until arms management was complete. He confirmed, however, that he had agreed to promulgate the interim constitution and stand the interim parliament up with Maoist participation once UN monitoring of Maoist combatants and separation of their arms began. Koirala, who was joined by his Foreign Policy Advisor Dr. Chalise, was not pleased by the Maoist declaration December 19 of a nationwide strike in response to the Government of Nepal's nomination of ambassadors and human rights commissioners, but he did not seem overly concerned. The Prime Minister indicated the GON would not back down on the nominations. The Ambassador urged the GON to get its message out and asked the PM when the GON intended to reestablish law and order. He cited recent Maoist extortion of American citizens. At the conclusion, the Ambassador handed over the original of a letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration on Tibetan refugees (reftel). He also urged the Prime Minister to move ahead on resettlement of Bhutanese refugees. Koirala Ailing But Getting Better -- Slowly ------------------------------------------- [Â¶](http://www.bhutan-research.org/us-diplomatic-cables-on-bhutan/06kathmandu3253%22%20%5Cl%20%22par2) 2. (C) The Ambassador began his December 20 meeting with Prime Minister GP Koirala by asking after his health. The Prime Minister admitted he had not been feeling well. He was still recovering from a cold and the process was taking time. The Ambassador asked if his condition was like it had been in the spring of 2006 when the Prime Minister was often incapacitated, and the Prime Minister confirmed that was the case. Koirala volunteered that he was having trouble breathing properly and had to take oxygen when he went up the stairs and when he came down. The Ambassador responded that we and the whole country of Nepal were praying for him. Maoists In Interim Government Only After Arms Management Complete --------------------------------------------- ----------- [Â¶](http://www.bhutan-research.org/us-diplomatic-cables-on-bhutan/06kathmandu3253%22%20%5Cl%20%22par3) 3. (C) The Prime Minister confirmed to the Ambassador that he had held firm in negotiations over the interim constitution that concluded on December 16 that the Maoists would not be permitted to join the interim government until the UN had completed the process of cantonment of Maoist combatants and separation of their arms. The Ambassador congratulated him on his strong stand. Koirala added, however, that he had agreed to promulgate the interim constitution once the UN process of arms monitoring commenced. The establishment of the interim parliament would follow immediately thereafter. That would mean, his Foreign Policy Advisor Dr. Chalise confirmed, that the Maoists would be in the interim parliament while the process of arms management was still going on. The Prime Minister was insistent, however, that the Maoists would not be allowed into the interim government until the arms management process was complete and the Maoists knew that. Maoist Transportation Strike ---------------------------- [Â¶](http://www.bhutan-research.org/us-diplomatic-cables-on-bhutan/06kathmandu3253%22%20%5Cl%20%22par4) 4. (C) Although he was not pleased, the Prime Minister did not seem overly concerned by the nationwide transportation strike that the Maoists had declared on December 19. Koirala was adamant that he did not intend to reverse the Cabinet's December 18 decision to nominate fourteen Ambassadors (including Dr. Chalise as Ambassador to the U.S.) as well as four members of the National Human Rights Commission. The PM said he had told the Maoists prior to the Cabinet decision that they would be given several Embassies once they joined the interim government. This was a case, he stated, of the Maoists flexing their muscles. The Ambassador said this was to be expected. Ongoing Maoist Abuses; Law and Order ------------------------------------ [Â¶](http://www.bhutan-research.org/us-diplomatic-cables-on-bhutan/06kathmandu3253%22%20%5Cl%20%22par5) 5. (C) The Ambassador encouraged the GON to get its message out. The Government was fulfilling its obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Maoists were not. They were still recruiting new and underage Nepalis into their People's Liberation Army (PLA). The Prime Minister replied that the United Nations had made it clear that it would not register the new recruits and children would not be registered as combatants. The Ambassador responded that that was fine, but the Government needed to say publicly every other day to these new recruits and children that they would not be registered, paid or given Government jobs; they needed to return to their villages. Dr. Chalise conceded that the GON had been overly defensive. The Ambassador asked when the GON intended to start enforcing law and order. The Prime Minister and Chalise emphasized that the Government was re-establishing police posts. The Ambassador cited the case of several Americans in Kathmandu who had faced Maoist extortion demands the week of December 11. The PM said those cases would be investigated. In response to a question from the Ambassador on how the U.S. could help, the Prime Minister promised to let us know. Tibetan and Bhutanese Refugees ------------------------------ [Â¶](http://www.bhutan-research.org/us-diplomatic-cables-on-bhutan/06kathmandu3253%22%20%5Cl%20%22par6) 6. (C) The Ambassador handed over the original of a letter conveyed earlier from Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees and Migration Sauerbrey requesting the Prime Minister's assistance with Tibetan refugees (reftel). Dr. Chalise said that he would look it over and discuss it with the Prime Minister. The Ambassador also took the opportunity to urge the Prime Minister to move ahead on third-country resettlement of Bhutanese refugees. The United States, the Ambassador said, was aware of Foreign Minister Oli's concern about holding a summit meeting with his Bhutanese counterpart in Thimpu on this issue when the Nepali government was about to change. The Ambassador emphasized, however, that it also did not make sense to wait until the meeting (which was planned for November and then postponed to December) was rescheduled. The Prime Minister did not respond. Comment ------- [Â¶](http://www.bhutan-research.org/us-diplomatic-cables-on-bhutan/06kathmandu3253#par7) 7. (C) It was good to hear from the Prime Minister himself that he has no intention of allowing the Maoists into the interim government until the UN has completed the arms management process. Nevertheless, the Maoists will continue to probe for ways to undermine the PM's firm stand. Post will push the GON and UN Secretary General's personal representative Ian Martin and his team to not allow the arrival of a few arms monitors (possibly before the end of December) or the hiring of ex-Gurkhas to serve as a sufficient basis for hasty promulgation of the interim constitution. The new constitution should not be promulgated until all 35 of the initial group of UN arms monitors are on the ground. All of the 21 satellite PLA camps will also have to be agreed upon. It was encouraging as well to learn that Koirala does not intend to back down on nominations of senior officials in the face of Maoist pressure tactics. As the Prime Minister himself said, the Maoists do not have the strength they claim to have and will face considerable animosity, particularly in the countryside, as soon as Nepalis feel free enough to express their true opinions. DEAN